Objectives: To evaluate the impact that an electronic ordering system has on the rate of rejection of blood type and screen testing samples and the impact on the number of ABO blood-type discrepancies over a 4-year period.
Methods: An electronic ordering system was implemented in May 2011. Rejection rates along with reasons for rejection were tracked between January 2010 and December 2013.
Results: A total of 40,104 blood samples were received during this period, of which 706 (1.8%) were rejected for the following reasons: 382 (54.0%) unsigned samples, 235 (33.0%) mislabeled samples, 57 (8.0%) unsigned requisitions, 18 (2.5%) incorrect tubes, and 14 (1.9%) ABO discrepancies. Of the samples, 2.5% were rejected in the year prior to implementing the electronic ordering system compared with 1.2% in the year following implementation (P < .0001).
Conclusions: Our data demonstrate that implementation of an electronic ordering system significantly decreased the rate of blood sample rejection.
RBC transfusions are a vital part of the management of several diseases. While they are generally safe when used appropriately, they are not without risk. 1 Although public focus has emphasized the risk of infectious disease associated with transfusions, there is in fact a higher risk of adverse outcomes from transfusion errors. 2 The risk of ABO-incompatible transfusion was reported by Linden et al 2 as one in 38,000, which exceeds the aggregate risk of all transfusion-associated viral infections (one in 50,000). The transfusion of ABO-incompatible blood poses a great risk to patients and may result in serious clinical consequences such as acute hemolytic transfusion reaction, renal failure, shock, and death.
Transfusion of blood is a complex process that entails specimen collection, labeling, type and screen testing, release and issuance of correct product, and finally transfusion to the correct recipient. Human error can occur at any point in this process. Linden with a number of safety checks in place, wrong blood in tube can still occur. Wrong blood in tube (WBIT) is defined as "blood taken from the wrong patient and labeled with the intended patient's details" or "blood taken from the intended patient but labeled with another patient's detail." 4 Transfusion services often identify WBIT through comparison with a historical type or comparison with a second type and screen sample. The incidence of WBIT (in a sample that appears correctly labeled) has been reported as one in 1,500 to one in 3,000 samples. 5 Given the large percentage of errors attributable to the preanalytical component, it is not surprising that a number of regulations and interventions are used by the industry to prevent transfusion error, particularly the transfusion of ABO-incompatible blood. These interventions include requiring strict adherence to blood bank specimen labeling policies, 6 educational campaigns with training on proper specimen collection, 6 technological interventions such as barcode devices with label printing functionality for patient identification, 7 and confirmatory testing with a second sample. 8, 9 Electronic order systems with barcode labels have been shown to improve transfusion safety. 10 It is estimated that a barcode system is 15 to 20 times safer than manual processes. 11 At our institution, electronic blood bank test order entry was implemented during an upgrade to the laboratory information system. The upgrade changed the hospital workflow from paper test requisitions for type and screen testing to electronic test order entry with a barcode specimen label printing at the clinical site where the order was placed. A barcode-labeled tube initialed by the person who collected the sample was required after the upgrade. This study analyzes the impact of the electronic order entry system on the rate of rejection of patient samples for blood type and screen testing, the rate of ABO blood-type discrepancies, and the incidence and cause of WBIT over a 4-year period.
Materials and Methods
All samples received in the blood bank for blood type and screen testing at the NewYork-Presbyterian Allen Hospital, a metropolitan community hospital, between January 2010 and December 2013 were included in the study. During this time period, there was a laboratory information system upgrade that involved implementation of the SafeTrace Tx Transfusion Management Software Solution (Haemonetics Corporation, Braintree, MA), which supported electronic test order entry from the hospital electronic medical record system. The number of samples rejected before and after the intervention was evaluated. The upgrade took place on May 7, 2011, and involved a transition from paper test requisition to an electronic order for type and screen testing. In addition, a barcode specimen label printed at the clinical site that the order was placed. Therefore, prior to May 2011, all samples were labeled with two patient identifiers (name and medical record number or name and date of birth) either handwritten or with a label from the patient's chart initialed by the phlebotomist accompanied by a handwritten paper requisition form. After the system upgrade, an electronic order was placed and the sample tubes were labeled with a printed barcode label and initialed by the person who collected the sample.
The sample labeling requirements included the patient's full name, medical record number or date of birth, and initials of the person who drew the blood. If the sample did not contain the mandatory information, it was rejected. If the manual test requisition was not completed in its entirety or if the name differed between the requisition and the specimen label, the specimen was rejected.
Data for this study were obtained from quality assurance reports prepared quarterly by the manager of the blood bank. For quality assurance purposes, the blood bank tracked samples rejected for the following errors: unsigned specimen label, unsigned test requisition, mislabeled specimen (specimen and requisition do not match, name discrepancy, date of birth discrepancy, specimen unlabeled, requisition unlabeled, incorrect medical record number), incorrect tube type, and blood type discrepancy. ABO discrepancies were identified by comparing the current blood type with the historical blood type or comparing the results of two separate present blood samples. The blood bank staff investigated the ABO discrepancies by retyping the specimens, checking patient and blood sample identifiers, and reviewing the medical records. The events resulting in ABO discrepancies were categorized into three groups: technologist errors (typing errors, transcription errors), administrative errors (errors due to incorrect merging of the electronic medical records), and WBIT. The rates of these errors were compared before and after electronic order entry implementation.
Statistical analysis was performed using a v 2 analysis to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the rate of blood sample rejection in the year before and after implementation of the electronic order entry system. Statistical significance was defined as P value less than .05. Calculations were performed using SAS 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC).
Results
A total of 40,104 blood samples were received for type and screen testing over a 4-year period, of which 706 (1.8%) were rejected: 382 (54.0%) unsigned samples, 235 (33.0%) mislabeled samples, 57 (8.0%) unsigned requisitions, 18 (2.5%) incorrect tube types, and 14 (1.9%) ABO discrepancies. Of the samples, 2.5% were rejected in the year prior to implementing the electronic ordering system compared with 1.2% of samples in the year after implementation (P < .0001), a 51% reduction in the number of rejected samples Table 1 . When analyzing the causes of sample rejection, a decrease in the number of mislabeled samples was observed with the implementation of a barcode label. The barcode label freed the provider from manual data entry on the tube and requisition, a process fraught with spelling errors and errors of omission. As expected, there was also a reduction in the number of unsigned requisitions. The number of unsigned requisitions went from 42 in 2010, the year prior to implementation, to six in 2012, the year after implementation since paper requisitions were no longer used except in rare circumstances. The decreased use of paper requisitions also contributed to the decrease in mislabeled samples, as this included cases with discrepant test requisition and blood tube label. When comparing the number of rejected samples due to errors directly attributable to paper requisitions, unsigned requisitions, and mislabeled specimens, these two causes accounted for 64% of the total rejected samples in the year prior to implementation of the electronic order entry system and only 23% of total rejected samples the year after.
The total incidence of blood typing discrepancies over the 4 years ranged from one in 1,981 samples to one in 10,083 samples per year. Of the 14 ABO discrepancies, seven were the result of WBIT; two were the result of technologist error, including one typing error and one transcription error; and three were administrative errors related to medical record merging. The root cause for two cases remained unknown. In one case, the patient had a historical blood type of O Rh D-antigen negative, but the current type was completed as O Rh D-antigen positive. A second specimen was obtained and again typed as O Rh D-antigen positive. This difference could be attributed to differences in anti-D reagent sensitivity used in the blood bank; however, this was not definitely proven as the cause. In the other case, the patient typed as AB Rh D-antigen negative, which was discrepant from a history of B Rh D-antigen positive. A second sample was requested and again typed as AB Rh D-antigen negative. The cause of this discrepancy remained unclear. The rate of ABO discrepancies declined from one in 1,981 samples in 2010, the year before intervention, to one in 3,371 samples in 2012, the year after initiating the electronic order entry system. The incidence of WBIT, discovered by an ABO discrepancy from a historical type, ranged from zero per year to one in 2,000 per year-one in 2010, five in 2011, one in 2012, and zero in 2013 Table 2 .
Discussion
The transition to the SafeTrace Tx Transfusion Management Software Solution enabled electronic order entry for blood type and screen testing. Our data demonstrate that implementation of this system significantly Mislabeled specimens include cases where specimen and requisition do not match, name discrepancy, date of birth discrepancy, specimen unlabeled, requisition unlabeled, and incorrect medical record number. decreased the rate of sample rejection, with a 51% reduction in the number of rejected samples when comparing the year prior to the intervention with the year following the intervention. The upgraded system used barcode specimen labels that printed at the nursing area adjacent to the patient location. Manual data entry on paper test requisitions and specimen labels led to errors that resulted in specimen rejection (unsigned test requisition, specimen and requisition do not match, name discrepancy, date of birth discrepancy, specimen unlabeled, requisition unlabeled, incorrect medical record number), and when the manual data entry was replaced with electronic ordering and barcode labels, the errors were essentially eliminated. Unsigned specimen, incorrect tube type, and blood-type discrepancy were elements that existed prior to and remained after implementation. It was previously demonstrated that a computerized barcode-based tracking system reduced the blood sample rejection rate from 1.82% to 0.17% after implementation. 7 Indeed, in our study, the rate of mislabeled samples decreased from one (1.1%) in 88 in the year prior to implementation to one (0.2%) in 460 in the year following implementation. Although generally safer, electronic ordering systems in which the printed barcode label prints at a central nursing station create a new workflow with its own limitations, including the possibility of adhering the printed barcode label onto the wrong tube. Our institution recently implemented PatientSafe Solutions' (San Diego, CA) technology, which enables the printing of the barcode label at the patient's bedside after scanning the identification wristband to mitigate this risk.
Although the observed number of WBIT events was rare, any occurrence of this nature is cause for concern. Following the implementation of the electronic ordering system, five instances of WBIT occurred. Of these cases, two were within 2 weeks from the implementation date. Eventually, by 2013, after the system had been in use for over a year, there were zero detected cases of WBIT. One case of WBIT occurred when a physician placed electronic orders on one patient but mistakenly affixed the printed barcode label onto specimens belonging to a different patient, triggering a discrepancy from the historical blood type. This emphasizes that although this system improves quality with a reduction of rejected samples, human error exists and additional safety elements are needed. Thus, an entire system aimed at patient transfusion safety, including electronic ordering systems, barcode labels printed at the bedside, and ABO confirmatory testing on new patients, is ideal.
WBIT events, in which samples appear properly labeled but blood is collected from a different patient, are the most concerning errors. 8 Although the absolute number of WBIT events is low, the potential for harm is high since they can result in ABO-incompatible transfusion and go undetected until the transfusion occurs. The incidence of WBIT has been reported as one in 1,500 to one in 3,000 samples. 5 In the current study, all the WBIT cases were detected from an ABO discrepancy with a historical blood type. The highest yearly rate of WBIT was one in 2,000, consistent with other reported estimates. However, our data may underestimate the number of WBIT events by missing those without a historical blood type on file and, by chance, when two samples from different patients have the same blood type. Our institution will require a second sample for type and screen confirmation on patients without a historical type in the near future. Fortunately, at our institution during this time frame, there were no transfusions of ABO-incompatible blood. ABOincompatible transfusion reactions are one of the hospitalacquired conditions determined by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in which the hospital will not be reimbursed for cost incurred due to adverse clinical outcomes as a consequence of the transfusion. 12 Thus, although patient safety is the driving priority for these initiatives, there are financial implications worth considering as well. The introduction of this CMS policy, which penalized hospitals for ABO-incompatible transfusions, heightened awareness regarding transfusion safety and therefore undoubtedly improved adherence to safe transfusion practices throughout departments. The current study demonstrates that implementation of an electronic ordering system along with patient-specific barcode labels printed at the time of collection for type and screen specimens successfully reduced the number of rejected specimens.
